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Immunity-Based Accommodation of Aircraft Subsystem Failures 
 
 This thesis presents the design, development, and flight-simulation testing of an 
artificial immune system (AIS) based approach for accommodation of different aircraft 
subsystem failures. 
 Failure accommodation is considered as part of a complex integrated AIS scheme that 
contains four major components: failure detection, identification, evaluation, and 
accommodation. The accommodation part consists of providing compensatory commands to the 
aircraft under specific abnormal conditions based on previous experience. In this research effort, 
the possibility of building an AIS allowing the extraction of pilot commands is investigated.  
 The proposed approach is based on structuring the self (nominal conditions) and the 
non-self (abnormal conditions) within the AIS paradigm, as sets of artificial memory cells 
(mimicking behavior of T-cells, B-cells, and antibodies) consisting of measurement strings, over 
pre-defined time windows. Each string is a set of features values at each sample time of the flight 
including pilot inputs, system states, and other variables. The accommodation algorithm relies on 
identifying the memory cell that is the most similar to the in-coming measurements. Once the 
best match is found, control commands corresponding to this match will be extracted from the 
memory and used for control purposes. 
 The proposed methodology is illustrated through simulation of simple maneuvers at 
nominal flight conditions, different actuators, and sensor failure conditions. Data for 
development and demonstration have been collected from West Virginia University 6-degrees-
of-freedom motion-based flight simulator. The aircraft model used for this research represents a 
supersonic fighter which includes model following adaptive control laws based on non-linear 
dynamic inversion and artificial neural network augmentation. 
 The simulation results demonstrate the possibility of extracting pilot compensatory 
commands from the self/non-self structure and the capability of the AIS paradigm to address the 
problem of accommodating actuator and sensor malfunctions as a part of a comprehensive and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 Flight safety has always been a number one concern for aircraft operation. Vehicle 
subsystem failures and structural damages have been proven to be the major accident causes for 
both civilian and military aircraft [1-4]. Pilot has to detect a problem in a timely manner and 
produce fast compensation to handle the abnormal situation. In order for this to happen, 
substantial amount of information has to be provided to the pilot about the failure in a short 
period of time and the pilot must have specific skills to handle the abnormal condition. There are 
several factors which may negatively affect the successful outcome. The complexity of modern 
machines, redundancy of information, and huge variety of all types of devices inside the cockpit 
may prevent pilot from reacting properly and generating appropriate response in an extreme 
situation. Over the entire history of aviation, a lot of effort was focused on minimizing pilot 
workload. A variety of control system design methodologies have been developed, starting with 
simple stability augmentation systems and ending up with sophisticated adaptive control laws [5-
7]. Significant recent research efforts were aimed at increasing aircraft operation safety through 
the development of integrated fault tolerant control systems capable of high performance real 
time failure detection, identification, evaluation, and accommodation (FDIEA) [8-10]. 
 
 The aircraft subsystem FDIEA problem consists of four components. The first 
component refers to acknowledging the presence of an abnormal condition (AC). The second 
component, failure identification, consists of specifying which subsystem and which of its 
elements has failed. The third component is evaluation, and it refers to the assessment of failure 
type, failure magnitude/severity, and the prediction of its impact on the reduction of the flight 
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envelope [11]. Finally, the last component is accommodation and it is responsible for providing 
an adaptive control law that will help mitigating the consequences of the failure. 
 
 Significant research efforts towards solving the FDIEA problem have been performed 
in recent years [12, 13]; however, these efforts were mostly focused on the individual classes of 
failures within limited regions of the flight envelope. For this reason, a strong need for a 
comprehensive integrated solution to the given problem for aircraft subsystems has been widely 
acknowledged [14-16]. 
 
 Finding a comprehensive solution to the FDIEA problem is an extremely complicated, 
multidimensional task that requires appropriate tools, high-level accuracy and most importantly - 
extensive robustness. Such a complexity of the problem has made engineers think outside of the 
conventional frame of control systems and seek ideas from somewhere else. Biological world 
inspired methodologies have become very popular among researchers lately. Various control 
systems based on these methodologies have been successfully developed and implemented, such 
as artificial neural network [17], evolutionary algorithms [18], DNA computation [19], and 
artificial immune systems [8, 20, 21]. 
 
 A biologically inspired framework that integrates all major aspects of fault tolerant 
control capabilities - detection, identification, evaluation, and accommodation - is currently 
under development at West Virginia University (WVU) and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University (ERAU) [8, 10]. This research effort is aimed at providing a novel robust adaptive 
system that can deal with the enormous variety of known and unknown disturbances and failures 
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by obtaining a comprehensive solution to the FDIEA problem on the basis of biologically 
inspired techniques, such as the immune system paradigm [22] 
 
 Techniques based on artificial immune systems (AIS) are extremely promising 
candidates for solving the FDIEA problem because of the capabilities of their biological sources. 
The natural immune system responds to every requirement that FDIEA problem is restrained to: 
capability of detecting the harmful entities, defining which exact part of the organism is under 
attack, generating antibodies which can fight the harmful intruders and being able to remember 
the disease. Therefore, when the harmful antigens invade the body in the future, the immune 
response becomes faster and more effective. The biological immune system functionality is 
based on the self/non-self discrimination principle, when it distinguishes between the entities that 
belong to the organism and the entities that do not. For AIS-based schemes, this principle is 
transposed to a real aircraft: all the flight data for aircraft collected under nominal conditions 
represent the self, and those that were collected under abnormal conditions or simply outside self 
represent the non-self.  
 
 The immunity-based AC accommodation problem can be approached based on two 
different concepts. The first concept is the biological feedback that establishes a balance between 
the activation and suppression of the antibodies generation. This mechanism can be converted 
into an adaptive component augmenting a baseline controller [23]. The idea is to model the 
biological system by providing governing equations and then to correlate those laws with the real 
aircraft features. The second conceptual approach under the AIS paradigm for control purposes is 
based on the assumption that the classification capabilities of the AIS can be extended and used 
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not only to detect, identify, and evaluate, but also to provide some solution that would minimize 
or exclude the AC effects [10, 24]. For this approach, both control and controlled variables have 
to be a part of the feature set and the flight performance should be presented under specific 
conditions and constraints. 
 
 This research effort is focused on the second conceptual approach for solving the AC 
accommodation problem. It represents a preliminary critical phase with the main objective of 
investigating the possibility of extracting compensatory commands from the AIS self/non-self 
structure. The method to complete the task in this thesis relies on generating artificial memory 
cells, which represent the self (nominal conditions) and the non-self (abnormal conditions) 
within the artificial immune system paradigm. Both self and non-self are structured as memory 
cells consisting of measurement strings over pre-defined time windows. Each string is a set of 
features values at each sample time of the flight including pilot inputs, system states, and other 
variables. These flight features are selected such that they capture the dynamic fingerprint of the 
aircraft operation at normal and abnormal conditions and the required pilot action. The 
accommodation process works as follows: collections of strings over several time samples of 
current flight are compared to the collections of strings in the memory. Once the best match is 
found, control commands corresponding to this match will be extracted from the memory and 
used for control purposes. 
 
 This thesis includes the description, development, and assessment of all the steps that 
were mentioned above. A brief review of fault tolerant control systems, and biologically inspired 
methodologies used for designing these systems is provided in Chapter 2. A description of the 
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integrated FDIEA problem is presented in Chapter 3. FDIEA problem within the AIS paradigm 
is described in Chapter 4. AIS-based aircraft subsystem failure accommodation schemes are 
covered in Chapter 5 followed by the description of the simulation environment in Chapter 6. 
The developed algorithms implementation is depicted in Chapter 7. Test results, analysis, and the 
research evaluation are discussed in Chapter 8. Finally, some conclusions and future work are 
proposed in Chapter 9. 
 The main contributions of this research effort are: 
1) Investigating the use of the AIS paradigm for control purposes using a novel 
methodology 
2) Investigating the possibility of extracting compensatory control commands from properly 
built self/non-self structures within the AIS paradigm 
3) Demonstrating the effectiveness of the solution using a motion-based flight simulator for 
several actuator and sensor failures 
 The research effort presented in this thesis has resulted in the following publications 
and submissions: 
1)  A. Togayev, M. G. Perhinschi, D. A. Azzawi, H. Moncayo, I. Moguel, and A. Perez, 
"Immunity-Based Abnormal Condition Accommodation of Aircraft Subsystem Failures", 
accepted in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Annual Dynamic Systems and 
Control Conference, San Antonio, TX, October 2014 
2)  Moguel I., Moncayo H., Perhinschi M.G., Perez A., Azzawi D. A., Togayev A., 
"Structured Non-Self Approach for Aircraft Failure Identification within an Immunity-
based Fault Tolerance Architecture", submitted to the IEEE TAES, Jan. 2014 
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3) Moguel I., Moncayo H., Perhinschi M. G., Perez A. E., Al Azzawi D., Togayev A., "Bio- 
Inspired Approach for Aircraft Health Assessment and Flight Envelope Estimation", 
submitted to ASME Annual Dynamic Systems and Control Conference, San Antonio, 
Texas, Oct. 2014 
4)  Perez A. E., Moncayo H., Moguel I., Perhinschi M. G., Al Azzawi D., Togayev A., 
“Development of Immunity-based Adaptive Control Laws for Aircraft Fault Tolerance", 
submitted to ASME Annual Dynamic Systems and Control Conference, San Antonio, 
Texas, Oct. 2014 
5)  Al Azzawi D., Perhinschi M. G., Togayev A., Moncayo H., Moguel I., Perez A. E., 
"Evaluating Aircraft Abnormal Conditions Using an Artificial Dendritic Cell 
Mechanism", abstract submitted to International Conference and Exhibition on 
Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Sept. 2014 
6) Moguel I., Moncayo H., Perhinschi M. G., Al Azzawi D., Perez A. E., Togayev A., 
"Biologically-Inspired Approach for Aircraft Management under Upset Conditions", 
abstract submitted to International Conference and Exhibition on Mechanical and 
Aerospace Engineering, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Sept. 2014 
7) Perez A. E., Moncayo H., Togayev A., Perhinschi M. G., Al Azzawi D., “Pilot-in-the-
Loop Evaluation of a Bio-Inspired Adaptive Fault Tolerant Control System in a Motion 
Based Flight Simulator”, submitted to AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control 




Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Fault-Tolerant Control for Flight Systems 
 
 Fault tolerance is a property that enables a system to continue operating properly in the 
event of the failure of one or more of the system components. Fault-tolerant control system 
design enables the system to continue functioning, possibly at a reduced level of performance, 
rather than failing completely [25].  
 
 Fault-tolerant control (FTC) for aircraft systems has become extremely popular for 
control engineers over the past decades [26-31]. Aircraft safety has always been a number one 
concern in aviation. Therefore, designing a control system that can mitigate the effects of the 
failure and maintain the desirable stable state after the occurrence of the failure is the first and 
foremost objective. A failure is defined as a malfunction of any physical component of aircraft 
subsystem that results in operating differently from the desired pre-designed manner. The 
following are types of failures that might be encountered during aircraft operation: 
 Structural Failure/Damage 
 Engine Failure 
 Control Surface Failure 
 Sensor Failure 
 
 After the failure occurs, both pilot and autopilot (control system) must be informed in a 
timely manner. Time issue might play a crucial role in preventing catastrophic consequences. 
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Once the malfunction is detected, an appropriate action must be taken by pilot and/or autopilot. 
Typical fault-tolerant control system architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2.1 [32]. Note that 
structural and engine failures are not included in this system.  
 
Figure2.1: General Structure of Fault-Tolerant Control Systems 
 
 System consists of two major blocks: fault/failure detection and diagnosis block, and 
reconfiguration mechanism block. Each of the two components has received a lot of attention 
from researchers throughout the history of the FTC development, customization, and 
improvement [27, 33]. 
 
 Fault-tolerant control systems have been developed for different types of aircraft units: 
civil and military airplanes [34, 35], helicopters [36], UAVs [37], and near space vehicles [38]. 
However, most of the research efforts in the field of FTC were focused on specific limited 
problems: electro-mechanical actuator failures [39], loss of actuator efficiency [40], partial loss 
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of control [41], aircraft structural damage [34], etc. The need for a holistic approach that is 
capable of providing a comprehensive and integrated solution in this area has been widely 
acknowledged [9, 42, 43]. 
 
 Undoubtedly, the ultimate mission is to design and implement such a fault-tolerant 
control system that would be able to cover various types of failures over wide regions of the 
flight envelope. In other words, the designed system must possess robustness. Several models of 
robust control system that could detect, identify, evaluate, and accommodate the failure have 
been proposed in this research field – [9, 35, 44]. Yet these efforts do not cover desirably broad 
areas of flight envelope and failure varieties. The complexity of modern aircraft models makes 
designing a comprehensive adaptive system extremely problematic. Hence, the control engineers 
had to broaden their minds and look for new ideas from different sources.  
 
2.2 Immunity-based Systems 
 
 Utilizing biologically inspired methodologies as a basis for adaptive control systems 
has become a widely acknowledged practice in recent years. Among these systems are artificial 
neural networks, genetic algorithms, artificial immune systems [8, 17-21]. The more recent and 
promising artificial immune system approach is the least investigated and implemented. 
However, the biological origin - natural immune system - possesses such a complexity, 
robustness, and extensive set of capabilities that it could be an excellent source of inspiration for 
the design of comprehensive integrated fault-tolerant control system. There is a great number of 




 The immune system consists of a large network of cells, tissues, and organs that 
operate together to protect the organism. Immune system is a subject of great interest for 
researchers because of its capability to perform a vast variety of complicated tasks including 
pattern recognition, noise tolerance, generalization, optimization, etc. [24]. However, the three 
main features that make the immunity-based-approach very promising are [45]:  
1) Discrimination - capability of distinguishing between the substances that belong to 
organism and the ones that do not 
2) Specificity - the immune system can recognize an extremely large number of different 
antigens and induce a specific lymphocyte for each of them 
3) Memory - if the invader that had attacked in the past is encountered, the secondary 
response of the immune system will be more rapid and aggressive  
 
 There are several widely used techniques inspired from the natural immune system 
features:  
 clone selection algorithm- most commonly applied to optimization and pattern 
recognition problems [46], 
 negative selection algorithm (inspired from the selection processes that occur during the 
generation of T-cells in thymus) - typically used for classification and pattern 
recognition[47],  
 immune network algorithms - mostly used for clustering, data visualization, optimization, 
and control [48], 
 dendritic cell algorithms- algorithms inspired by natural dendritic cells (DCs) behavior 
and mostly focused on multi-scale processing and pattern recognition [22, 49].  
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 What is AIS? “Artificial Immune Systems are adaptive systems, inspired by theoretical 
immunology and observed immune functions, principles and models, which are applied to 
problem solving"[50]. The AIS was first mentioned in the articles on neural networks published 
in the mid-1980s by Farmer, Packard and Perelson [51], and Bersini and Varela [52]. However, 
as a new computational paradigm on its own right, the AIS emerged in the mid-1990s. The 
concept has proven itself as an inviting ground for research in various applications such as 
anomaly or breakage detection [53-56], data mining [54, 57], computer safety [47, 58-62], 
pattern recognition [63, 64], and adaptive control [24, 51, 65].  
 In recent years, the AIS-based methodology has shown promising results in flight 
failure detection, identification and evaluation (FDIE) [8, 10, 66]. The key idea in these research 
efforts was based on the distinguishing capability of biological immune system: self-non-self 
discrimination. When an aircraft operates under nominal conditions (none of the subsystems are 
failed), a certain configuration of flight features forms "self". After the failure of any subsystem 
occurs, a configuration of the features which does not match the "self" occurs - "non-self". 
Developing control systems within the AIS paradigm has been a major focus of the research 
groups from WVU and ERAU in recent years [8, 11, 22, 66-78]. 
2.3 Artificial Immune System for Failure Accommodation 
 
 The ultimate step in creating an integrated adaptive system which can ensure aircraft 
safety is failure accommodation. Once the failure is detected, identified, and evaluated, a certain 
necessary action must be taken to mitigate the malfunction consequences. If for FDIE problem 
the fundamental inspiring feature of the immune system was ability to distinguish between self 
and non-self, for accommodation problem there will be two different key features. The first is 
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ability to fight the intruders by producing special substances - antibodies, and the second – 
capability of remembering the past experience to react more aggressively if the same intruder 
comes back again. Some researchers even describe immune system as a "second brain" for the 
ability to remember past experiences [79]. 
 
 Certain success has been achieved lately in developing AIS-based adaptive control 
systems. A very good example of implementing AIS to create an adaptive control system is 
presented in an article by Karr [24]. Here, a control system operation is divided in two parts. The 
first part is reaction to the failures that already had taken place before (immune system memory). 
The second part is to produce new control commands to new failures using genetic algorithms 
(adaptive immune system mechanism).  
 
 Another case of using human memory/learning system as an example is presented by 
Weng [80] for micro aerial vehicle flapping motion control. In this work, assimilation between 
human memory system and neural-memory network is taken as a ground for creating an adaptive 
control system.  
 
 AIS-based failure accommodation can also be approached by imitating a biological 
feedback between activation and suppression of the antibodies generation. This mechanism can 
be converted into an adaptive component augmenting a baseline controller [23]. Described 
methodology was developed and successfully implemented to a supersonic fighter model by 
Perez [81]. A significant improvement in performance has been achieved by implementing the 
AIS based controller as compared to a regular PID controller. 
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 AIS has proven itself as a promising ground for building integrated adaptive control 
systems, although no systematical theoretical background has been provided to support this 
methodology so far. However, one has to remember that the AIS concept is still relatively young 





Chapter 3 The Aircraft Subsystem Failure Detection, 




3.1 FDIEA Problem Formulation 
 
 The aircraft subsystem FDIEA problem has to be defined in details: the subsystems 
addressed, the factors and levels of the failures considered, and the mission, must be established 
for each stage of the problem. The four processes grouped under the acronym FDIEA must be 
performed in subsequent phases in order to avoid unrecoverable post-failure fight conditions, 
regain equilibrium, and continue the mission. The general simplified methodology [82] of 








3.2 FDIEA Problem Components 
 
3.2.1 Detection 
 The detection represents the process of announcing that a generic malfunction of any 
subsystem has occurred. Any one or several subsystems may fail. These subsystems can be 
actuators, sensors, structural or propulsion systems, etc. In addition to the named ones, items 
such as software, human pilot, and the environment can be considered in the process. This would 
allow broadening the abnormal conditions set, such that situations like pilot fatigue, non-standard 
weather or turbulence would be considered as subsystem abnormal conditions as well within a 
generalized framework [82]. 
3.2.2 Identification 
 The identification or isolation process determines which subsystem has failed. The 
identification process can have different phases depending on the complexity of the addressed 
system. The first phase would be declaring which exact subsystem group has failed (e.g. sensor, 
actuator). The second phase would be specifying the element within the subsystem group. For 
example, if the first phase declared actuator failure, second phase should determine whether it 
was aileron, stabilator, or rudder. The last phase will define whether right or left aircraft surface 
failed (for the actuator example) [82]. 
3.2.3 Evaluation 
 Once the failure has been detected and correctly identified, the evaluation process has 
three aspects to address. One is of a qualitative nature and involves determining the type of 
failure. For example, the qualitative evaluation is expected to determine if an actuator failure 
consists of a locked actuator, or a freely moving control surface, or a reduction of control 
efficiency. The other two aspects are of a quantitative nature and can be defined as direct and 
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indirect. Direct evaluation has to provide a certain value - magnitude of failure e.g. severity. For 
example, right rudder locked at +4 degrees, or pitch rate sensor bias of +5 deg/s etc. The indirect 
evaluation is responsible for reassessment of flight envelope at post-failure condition with taking 
into consideration the entire set of limitations and constraints on the performance produced by 
the presence of the failure [82]. 
3.2.4 Accommodation 
 The ultimate step of the FDIEA problem is accommodation. It represents the actual 
reaction of pilot-aircraft system - compensating the failure by generating control commands. 
Within the second conceptual approach for solving the accommodation problem, there are two 
scenarios to be considered. The first one involves an unknown failure that requires a specific new 
compensation. The second scenario, assumes that substantial information about the failure and its 
compensation is available and stored in the AIS. This can be achieved by memorizing the 
dynamic fingerprint during first scenario situations, by generating and recording pilot 
compensation during actual or simulated failures, or by properly composing bits of information 
within the self and non-self. A simplified block diagram illustrating the process is shown in  
Fig 3.2. 
 In order to accomplish the last step of FDIEA problem successfully, each of the three 
components prior to the accommodation must complete their prescribed tasks accurately. In 
other words, the information about which subsystem failed, what exact part of subsystem failed, 
what is the magnitude of the failure must be provided. This is needed for the fault-tolerant 
control system to define whether this failure had been faced before or not. If positive, then 
appropriate commands would be retrieved from prior pilot performance, and if not, then an 
original algorithm has to be adopted to overcome the malfunction. Within this thesis only the 






3.3 FDIEA Problem Overview 
 
 Figure 3.3 represents general aspects of the FDIEA process and summarizes its 
ultimate objectives:  
1) Detect malfunction 
2) Identify the subsystem and component subject to the failure 
3) Provide qualitative and quantitative information about the failure. Evaluate and assess the 
possible flight envelope reduction due to the presence of the failure. Provide information 
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Figure 3.2: Two Types of Failure Accommodation 
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to the pilot and control system for decision making regarding modification of control and 
navigation strategies 
4) Generate control commands and have the aircraft subjected to those in order to 
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Figure 3.3: FDIEA Problem Block Diagram 
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Chapter 4 FDIEA Problem within the AIS Paradigm 
 
4.1 Natural Immune System 
 
 The immune system is designed to defend the body against foreign or dangerous 
invaders. Such invaders include bacteria, viruses, parasites, cancer cells, and even transplanted 
organs and tissues. The biological immune system consists of two components: innate system 
and adaptive system [83]. 
 
 Innate system does not require a previous encounter with a microorganism or other 
invader to work effectively. It responds to invaders immediately, without any need to learn to 
recognize them. Mostly, the following cells are involved in the process performing specific roles 
[84]: 
 Phagocytes - they ingest invaders. Phagocytes include macrophages, neutrophils, 
monocytes, and dendritic cells. 
 Natural killer cells - are formed ready to recognize and kill cancer cells and cells that are 
infected with certain viruses. 
 Antigen-presenting cells - recognize invaders. They consist of DCs, macrophages, and B-
cells. The DCs use antigen biochemical markers associated with danger- and safe-signals 
to regulate the production of T-cells. 
 
 Adaptive system is built through previous exposure to invading antigens. Here, 
lymphocytes (B-cells and T-cells) encounter an invader, learn how to attack it, and remember the 
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specific invader so they can attack it even more efficiently the next time they encounter it. T-
cells are the component of adaptive system with the most important role in the defending 
process. These cells are first generated in bone marrow and proliferate in thymus through a 
pseudo-random genetic rearrangement mechanism. The DCs make sure that those T-cells, whose 
markers match the dangerous antigen, are produced in a larger quantity. On the contrary, if the 
environment is safe, this process is suppressed by suppressor T-cells (Ts-cells). Special helpers 
T-cells (Th-cells) activate the generation of cytotoxic T-cells (Tc-cells) and B-cells that produce 
antibodies specific to the antigen. The block diagram of the immune system feedback mechanism 
is presented in Figure 4.1 [79]: 
 
Figure 4.1: Block Diagram of the Immune System Feedback Response 
 
4.2 AIS Paradigm 
 
 When developing an AIS, it is important to remember that the final objective is not to 
duplicate the actions of the immune system, but to borrow the ideas from natural bio-world and 
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create a certain computational tool to solve the given problem using those ideas. There are four 
crucial features of biological immune system that should be transposed to the AIS: 
1) Ability to accurately distinguish between what belongs to the body (self) and what does 
not (non-self) 
2) Capability of fighting and destroying the dangerous invaders 
3) Potential for facing and handling a great variety of known and unknown harmful 
substances  
4) Ability to remember the information about past encounters and facilitate more rapid and 
aggressive response (generate corresponding T-cells and B-cells) if the same antigen 
invades the organism again.  
 AIS-based FDIEA will consist of three main components functionally connected in a 
closed loop as shown in Fig. 4.2 [82]: 
 




 Pre-processing of information and flight data 
 On-line AC detection, identification, evaluation, and accommodation 
 Post-flight analysis of data and FDIEA outcomes 
 
 The pre-processing stage represents the development of aircraft subsystem FDIEA 
comprehensive and integrated scheme. This includes clear definition of the scheme components 
such as aircraft subsystems, abnormal conditions types (known and unknown), failure severity 
scales, flight envelope features, etc. Only after every item of the system is clearly defined, a 
robust model of self and non-self can be built.  
 
 The on-line FDIEA process implies the real time operation of the FDIEA scheme. 
Current flight measurements at a certain sampling rate are compared against the detectors, 
identifiers, evaluators, and compensators. This process is followed by generating the FDIEA 
outcomes. These outcomes are transferred to the pilot and/or aircraft and to the post-processing 
block. 
 
 The post-processing block is responsible for analyzing and evaluating the on-line 
scheme outcomes. Outcomes such as failed detection, false alarms, incorrect evaluations, wrong 
control commands need to be assessed. Using this assessment the appropriate changes must be 




Chapter 5 Biologically Inspired Failure Accommodation 
 
5.1 AIS Accommodation Problem Outline 
 
 The main objective of this research effort is to investigate the possibility of using AIS 
to extract compensatory commands from pilot performance followed by implementing those 
commands to the same aircraft. Within this research effort, this process will be referred to as 
“accommodation problem”. However, note that the actual accommodation problem is more 
complicated and firmly connected to the other parts of FDIEA problem.   
 
 It is important to clarify that we assume successful execution of all the steps prior to the 
accommodation part in the FDIEA process. This means that a certain failure was detected, 
identified, and evaluated within the framework as it was formulated in Chapter 4. The focus in 
this thesis is on the accommodation part only; therefore, data used for building the self/non-self 
is limited and not necessarily sufficient to address the other components of the FDIEA process. 
The pilot will perform ad-hoc designed flight simulation tests under nominal and failure 
conditions. Afterwards, the data from these tests will be used to build the specific self/non-self 
and serve as base ground for building the accommodation algorithm. To validate the proposed 
algorithm, failures, previously handled by the pilot, will be injected during the simulation of the 
same maneuvers. 
 
 In order to solve the accommodation problem, a set of certain steps must be 
accomplished. There are six main components of the problem connected with each other. Figure 
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5.1 presents the block diagram of the failure accommodation problem main components. Every 




5.1.1 Defining a Mathematical Model 
 An appropriate mathematical model with components that are maximally pertinent to 
the AIS terminology must be proposed. Defining the right set of variables, the form of their 
representation and interaction is crucial, because the entire following algorithm, and the AIS 
components definition will be based on the chosen model. 
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Figure 5.1: Accommodation Problem Main Components 
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5.1.2 Generating the Artificial Memory Cells 
 There is a certain flight path that the aircraft should follow. There are also specific 
flight conditions which the aircraft should maintain during the flight (e.g. constant altitude, 
constant velocity). These parameters define the task and are considered as the input to the 
pilot+aircraft system. After being informed about this flight path and about the specific flight 
conditions, an experienced pilot intends to execute the task as close as possible to command. An 
aircraft following the desirable flight path under the commanded flight conditions will be 
assimilated to a healthy organism. Every value of in-coming flight variable that alters from the 
desirable value during the pilot performance will be defined as invading entity/antigen. The 
control commands provided by the pilot that are trying to bring the aircraft to the desirable state 
will be defined as immune system antibodies. This process is an analogy to the immune system 
being affected by a disease for the first time. The adaptive immune system fights back and 
generates antibodies, which eventually eliminate the disease. The recorded and saved flight data 
will define a set of created artificial memory cells (B-cells and T-cells, and antibodies) and 
antigens. 




 Pilot  Pilot 
Commands 
Aircraft 





Figure 5.2: Simplified Artificial Memory Cells Generating Process 
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5.1.3 Matching Algorithm Design and Development 
 The secondary response of the immune system to the same invaders is more rapid and 
aggressive. This happens mainly because the memory has information about the invaders 
(antigens) and the cells that are needed to suppress those invaders (T-cells and B-cells, 
antibodies). Unlike the natural immune system, our "aircraft model system" cannot automatically 
match the incoming antigens with the corresponding antibodies, and T-cells and B-cells. That is 
why at this stage, an algorithm of finding the best corresponding match should be designed and 
implemented.  
 The simplified version of the entire process can be described as follows. An in-coming 
set of antigens is compared to the sets of antigens that had been previously encountered by the 
system. Once the most similar set is found, a set of antibodies that had been used for suppressing 
the antigens is extracted. Note that for each set of antigens there is a set of antibodies stored in 
the AIS memory. The overview of the matching algorithm is presented in Fig. 5.3: 
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Figure 5.3: Matching Algorithm Process 
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5.1.4 Preparation of the Simulation Environment 
 In order to develop, design, and demonstrate the operation of the accommodation 
algorithm, the simulation environment has to be prepared very carefully. One needs to define 
properly all the flight conditions for the pilot so that he/she could perform the task accurately. 
Quality of the data acquired from pilot's performance plays an important role in obtaining good 
results.  
5.1.5 Practical Implementation 
 After successful generation of the artificial memory and algorithm design, the entire 
mechanism can be implemented within the simulation environment. This process can be 
described as a second encounter of disease invasion. The immune system recognizes the 
antigens, because the information is already in the memory, and fast response will be provided 
which will result in the destruction of antigens. For our model, all in-coming flight features to the 
aircraft will be considered as previously identified antigens which can be handled by the control 
command from the memory. 
 
5.1.6 Post-processing Analysis 
 At this stage, the control commands produced by the designed mechanism during the 
flight simulation are analyzed and assessed. Based on the results of the assessment, conclusions 
about the eligibility of the entire scheme are made. Afterwards, the necessary corrections are 
added to the scheme in order to improve the future performance. 
 
 General aspects of AIS-based failure accommodation problem are illustrated in Fig. 
5.4. It describes the entire failure accommodation process. The data from the reference input 
block and from the current flight measurements are compared first. The difference is considered 
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as an antigen to the system. In-coming antigen is compared to the previously suppressed antigens 
in the matching algorithm block. An outcome of this block is a set of control commands 
extracted from the AIS memory corresponding to the best match that has been found. This set of 
control commands are the input to the aircraft and determine its future behavior. Afterwards, the 
entire process is repeated. The data from all the blocks are collected to the post-processing 
analysis block. This is needed for the following analysis of the results, which is expected to 
provide the opportunity to improve the performance level of the entire algorithm. 
 
 
 It should be emphasized that considering in-coming values of flight parameters under 
both nominal and abnormal conditions as antigens is essential to the proposed approach. In the 
case of the failure, all the information about it is available, as an outcome from the detection, 
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Figure 5.4: AIS-Based Failure Accommodation Process 
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5.2 Mathematical Model 
A set of flight features (FF) must be selected such that they capture the dynamic 
fingerprint of the aircraft operation at normal and abnormal conditions. FF can be defined as a 
set of Nf components: 
 
𝐹𝐹 = { 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡1  , 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡2  , … , 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑁𝑓 }  (5.1) 
where featj  (j=1,2, …, Nf) is the feature (e.g. roll rate, velocity) that was selected for the 
algorithm. 
An input (or mission objectives) for a pilot can be defined by matrix REF. Every row in 
this matrix is represented by a vector REFv of length Nf. 
 
𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑣 = [𝑑𝑓1, 𝑑𝑓2, … , 𝑑𝑓𝑁𝑓 ]   (5.2) 
 
Each element dfj of the vector REFv represents a desirable value of the corresponding 
feature in set FF. Duration of the flight is defined by number of time samples ts. Consequently, 
matrix REF consists of ts rows. 
An outcome of pilot's performance is a matrix PF. Every row in this matrix is represented 
by a vector PFv of length Nf. 
 
𝑃𝐹𝑣 = [𝑝𝑓1, 𝑝𝑓2, … , 𝑝𝑓𝑁𝑓 ]   (5.3) 
 
Each element pfj of the vector PFv represents a value of the corresponding feature of set 
FF obtained from pilot performance. Matrix PF consists of ts rows as well. 
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Pilot generated control commands are defined by matrix PC. Every row in this matrix is 
represented by a vector PCv of a length Ncc, where Ncc is the number of control commands. 
 
𝑃𝐶𝑣 = [𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙1, 𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙2, … , 𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑁𝑐𝑐 ]   (5.4) 
 
Each element ctrlj of the vector PCv represents a control command provided by pilot at 
each time sample of the flight. Matrix PC consists of ts rows. 
Vector of in-coming values of features at every time sample is defined as INCv. The 
length of the vector is Nf. 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑣 = [𝑖𝑓1, 𝑖𝑓2, … , 𝑖𝑓𝑁𝑓 ]   (5.5) 
 
Each element ifj of the vector INCv represents an in-coming value of the corresponding 
feature of set FF. 
 
5.3 AIS Memory Cells Representation 
 The detailed configuration and representation of antigens, B-cells and T-cells, and 
antibodies must be defined. It is important to note that correspondence of biological immune 
system components to elements of the AIS is conceptual and must be understood in a generic 




 Set of antigens AGv will be presented as a difference between in-coming data and 
reference input (pilot mission). This difference is defined by subtraction of corresponding 
elements of vector INCv from corresponding elements of vector REFv at specific time sample tsc.  
 
𝐴𝐺𝑣 = 𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑣 − 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑣    (5.6) 
𝐴𝐺𝑣 = [𝑑𝑓1 − 𝑖𝑓1, 𝑑𝑓2 − 𝑖𝑓2, …  , 𝑑𝑓𝑁𝑓 − 𝑖𝑓𝑁𝑓 ]  (5.7) 
As a result of the subtraction, vector AG of length Nf is obtained. 
Depending on flight scenarios, the content of the antigen cell might be extended and 
include not only values of differences but actual values of incoming features as well: 
 
𝐴𝐺𝑣 = [𝑑𝑓1 − 𝑖𝑓1, …  , 𝑑𝑓𝑁𝑓 − 𝑖𝑓𝑁𝑓 , 𝑖𝑓1, … , 𝑖𝑓𝑁𝑓 ]  (5.8) 
 
These additional features are selected according to a specific task and prescribed maneuver.  
 Collection of AGv vectors over the entire flight time defines the matrix AG. The overall 
number of time samples during the flight is ts, consequently matrix AG has ts rows. 
 
5.3.2 T-cells and B-cells 
 The immune system memory has information about T-cells and B-cells produced 




Within the AIS paradigm, T-cells together with B-cells will be assimilated to a difference 
between pilot features data and reference input data. Set of T-cells and B-cells for a specific time 
sample tsc is a vector TBv defined by subtraction of elements of vector PFv from corresponding 
elements of vector REFv. 
𝑇𝐵𝑣 = 𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑣 − 𝑃𝐹𝑣    (5.9) 
𝑇𝐵𝑣 = [𝑑𝑓1 − 𝑝𝑓1, 𝑑𝑓2 − 𝑝𝑓2, …  , 𝑑𝑓𝑁𝑓 − 𝑝𝑓𝑁𝑓 ] (5.10) 
Similarly to AGv vector, a TBv vector might need an extension and include some actual 
values of features obtained from pilot performance: 
𝑇𝐵𝑣 = [𝑑𝑓1 − 𝑝𝑓1, … , 𝑑𝑓𝑁𝑓 − 𝑝𝑓𝑁𝑓 ,𝑝𝑓1, … , 𝑝𝑓𝑁𝑓 ] (5.11) 
The additional features for TBv should be the same as for AGv. Collection of TBv vectors 
over the entire flight time defines the matrix TB. The overall number of time samples during the 
flight is ts consequently matrix TB has ts rows. 
 
5.3.3 Antibodies 
The set of antibodies for a specific time sample tsc is a vector ABv defined by 
corresponding vector from matrix PC. 
𝐴𝐵𝑣 = 𝑃𝐶𝑣     (5.12) 
The collection of ABv vectors over the entire flight time defines matrix AB. Structure of AIS 




5.4 Matching Algorithm 
During the entire time period dedicated to this research effort, the matching algorithm has 
been adjusted several times. Each adjustment makes the algorithm more sophisticated, and, as 
expected, improves the performance. In this section, each stage of designing the matching 
algorithm will be presented. 
5.4.1 Instant Matching Algorithm 
At each time sample an in-coming antigen AGv is compared to the sets of T-cells and B-
cells from matrix TB. Once the “best match” is found, a corresponding set of antibodies ABv is 
retrieved from matrix AB. As a result, we have control commands dictating the behavior of the 
aircraft. The “best match" is a row vector TBv (from matrix TB) which is most similar to an in-
coming antigen vector AGv. 























𝐸𝑅𝑅 = 𝐴𝐺𝑣 − 𝑇𝐵𝑣    (5.13) 
Then sum S can be defined as follows: 
𝑆 =  𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑖 )
𝑁𝑓
𝑖=1
   (5.14) 
where ERR(i) is an element of vector ERR. Therefore, a row vector TBv that leads to the lowest 
value of S is defined as the “best match”. It should be noted that more sophisticated matching 
algorithm may be used to improve performance. 
 
5.4.2 Artificial Memory Cell Matching 
 The matching algorithm presented in 5.4.1 relies on comparing in-coming antigen with 
AIS memory components at a single time sample, which typically does not ensure adequate 
robustness if feature derivatives are not included. In other words typically for higher 
performance, one should take into consideration the current state and the state in which aircraft 
had been before (i.e. several time samples before) or the trend. Also, considering time history of 
variables enhances the "memory" concept. It is envisioned that similar effects can be achieved by 
either including the feature derivatives or using a floating time window, or both. Including these 
elements is expected to increase the performance of the accommodation process; however, it will 
also require more computational power. It is expected that using a floating window of a certain 
width should be sufficient enough in terms of robustness. Undoubtedly, the larger the size of the 
window is, the more computational time will be necessary. 




Figure 5.6: Matching Algorithm with Floating Time Window 
 
 Let us denote Nt the size of a floating window that is taken into account during the 
matching process. Then vector (ERRv)j will be redefined as follows: 
 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑣 𝑗 =  𝐴𝐺𝑣 𝑗 − (𝑇𝐵𝑣)𝑗, 𝑗 = 𝑡𝑠𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡 ∶ 𝑡𝑠𝑐  (5.15) 
where tsc is a current time sample. Consequently, the sum S will be redefined as well: 
𝑆 =   𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑖 )
𝑁𝑓
𝑖=1
𝑗𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑗=𝑡𝑠𝑐−𝑁𝑡     (5.16) 
5.4.3 Normalization Process 
 Vector ERR is a result of subtraction of vector TBv from vector AGv. Elements of 
vectors AGv and TBv are different values of flight features that were defined previously. Since 
different flight features are involved in the algorithm, their values might vary in different ranges. 
In order to be consistent during the matching algorithm one must perform normalization. A 










 Xnorm- is a current difference value in a new normalized system 
 X - is a current difference value that needs to be normalized, 
 MinVal and MaxVal - minimum and maximum difference values of the considered 
feature within the certain flight scenario respectively, 
 Min and Max - minimum and maximum values in a new normalized system respectively. 
 For ensuring a better coverage of the possible range within a certain framework, a 
margin M can be added to both minimum and maximum values of the considered features: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑉𝑎𝑙 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑉𝑎𝑙 + 𝑀   (5.18) 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑙 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑙 − 𝑀   (5.19) 
Example of normalization process is illustrated in Fig. 5.7: 
 




5.4.4 Weighting the Features 
 Due to the large variety of the flight features and the complexity of the entire aircraft 
system including structural and aerodynamic characteristics, the values of different features 
typically have different numerical ranges. Some of the failures have more relevance in defining 
the dynamics of the flight than others. During the algorithm development and implementation it 
is essential to know to which flight feature one must pay more attention. For example, during the 
flight with an aileron failure, the error of the roll rate variable significantly affects the behavior 
of the aircraft. Therefore, to ensure that this error is tracked and matched accurately, it may be 
beneficial to increase the weight of this feature within the matching algorithm. 
 
 Example of increasing weight of a certain flight feature is illustrated in Fig. 5.8. As 
shown, the weight of flight feature number 2 is increased by W. This means that every feature 
value in the second column is multiplied by the number W for both antigens and T-cells and B-
cells matrices. After the weighting is completed, matching process is initiated. Note that more 
than one flight feature can have its weight altered. 
 




Chapter 6 Simulation Environment 
 
6.1 WVU Flight Simulator 
 The experimental data acquisition, practical implementation of developed algorithms, 
validation, and results assessment were all executed within the WVU simulation environment, 
which consists of the 6-DOF motion-based flight simulator and PC desktop simulator. 
 
6.1.1 Motion-Based 6-DOF Flight Simulator 
 The WVU Motus 600 Flight Simulator (see Fig. 6.1) manufactured by Fidelity Flight 
Simulation, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA includes the following components [85]: 
 6-DOF motion platform driven by electrical induction motors  
 Laminar Research X-Plane flight simulation software  
 LCD mosaic wall four-monitor external visual display  
 Instructors operating station  
 Computer and control cabinet. 
 
 The motion platform provides adequate six-degrees-of-freedom translational and 
rotational motion cues (see Fig. 6.2). Electrical motors are used to drive the motion base, which 
represents a very versatile and inexpensive solution to this type of application. Motion drive 
algorithms convert the motion of the aircraft as resulting from the dynamic model into motion of 
the platform such that the perception of the pilot is optimized within the physical limitations of 





Figure 6.1: The WVU 6-DOF Motion-based Flight Simulator 
 
 




 The WVU Flight Simulator has been interfaced with an external computer so that the 
chosen aircraft model can be run within Matlab/Simulink environment and drive the motion 
platform [87] (see Fig. 6.3 [85]). For this purpose, Aircraft Health Management environment 
using Matlab/Simulink has been developed in WVU [88]. The entire system operation can be 
described as follows. Pilot input signals are transmitted from the cockpit into Matlab/Simulink 
model. In turn, Matlab/Simulink model is connected to X-Plane [89] software. Outputs of the 
model are transferred to X-Plane to control all the simulator subsystems and to generate the 
visual cues as well. However, to drive the motion base, the control signals must be sent from 
external computer to the motion computer directly (not through X-Plane software). This system, 
developed within the WVU Aircraft Health Management environment, allows us to use various 
Simulink aircraft models to drive the simulator [90]. 
 
Figure 6.3: Interface of the WVU Flight Simulator with External Models 
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6.1.2 Desktop PC Simulator 
 Besides the motion-based flight simulator, a desktop PC flight simulator is available in 
the WVU simulation environment featuring identical mathematical models (see Fig. 6.4). 
 
Figure 6.4: WVU Desktop PC Flight Simulator 
 
 The Matlab/Simulink model used for desktop computer flight simulator is the same as 
the one used for the motion-based simulator. The interaction between the pilot and the model is 
accomplished by an external joystick. The pilot input signals are transferred to the 
Matlab/Simulink model from the joystick attached to the desktop computer. There are two 
joysticks attached to the computer (see Fig. 6.4). The first joystick (on the right) provides control 
commands on longitudinal, lateral and directional channels. The second joystick (on the left) is a 
throttle and regulates the engine thrust level. The outputs of the model are sent to FlightGear to 
control all the subsystems of the aircraft and for visualization purposes. 
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 FlightGear - software [91] used in desktop PC simulator - is an open-source flight 
simulator.  It supports a variety of popular platforms (Windows, Mac, Linux, etc.) and is 
developed by skilled volunteers from around the world.  Source code for the entire project is 
available and licensed under the GNU General Public License [92]. 
 Figure 6.5 illustrates the top level Simulink diagram interfaced with WVU Flight 
simulator. The developed Simulink system includes non-linear dynamics of the aircraft and 
models failures/damages of actuators, sensors, wings, and engine. The large blocks at the bottom 
of the diagram contain computational variables that are needed to transfer visual and aural cues 
to the simulator. These variables are needed to drive the motion of the simulator platform as 
well. 
 
Figure 6.5: WVU Simulation Environment Simulink Top Level Diagram 
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6.1.3 Aircraft Model 
 The aircraft aerodynamic model was derived from a non-linear model of a high 
performance military supersonic fighter [93]. This generic aircraft model was customized 
through some additional modeling of canard surfaces [88]. The aerodynamic and thrust 
characteristics are provided through 42 look-up tables, that is 16 tables for the longitudinal 
dynamics as functions of Mach number, angle of attack and stabilator deflection; 20 tables for 
the lateral-directional dynamics as functions of Mach number, angle of attack, sideslip angle and 
rudder; 2 tables for engine thrust and fuel flow as functions of Mach number and altitude. The 
visualization interface of the described aircraft provided by FlightGear is shown in Fig. 6.6: 
 
Figure 6.6: FlightGear Visualization of the Supersonic Fighter 
 
Additional look-up tables have been added for the modeling of the canards. The aircraft also 
includes model following adaptive control laws based on non-linear dynamic inversion and 
artificial neural networks.  
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6.1.4 Aircraft Subsystems Failure Modeling 
 To support the development and testing of the AIS-based failure accommodation 
process the flights under nominal and failure conditions were considered. Flight under nominal 
conditions implies that during the entire flight time none of the aircraft subsystems experienced 
any malfunctions/damages. Two types of failures were investigated within this research effort: 
actuator and sensor failures. 
6.1.4.1 Actuator Failure 
 Failures of individual left actuators (aileron, stabilator, or rudder) were considered. The 
failure implies that the aerodynamic control surface is stuck. At the failure occurrence, the 
actuator gets stuck at the current position or moves to a pre-defined position and stays fixed 
there. The blockage of the control surface at a fixed deflection does not alter the aerodynamic 
characteristics of the surface. However, it might change the balance between the moments and 
forces involved in the process.  
6.1.4.2 Sensor Failure 
 Failure of the gyro on the lateral channel was considered within this research effort. 
The simulation of the sensor failure implies a false sensor output. The transition to the biased 
sensor output is executed instantaneously (step bias). Note that gyro outputs on all three channels 
are used by the automatic feedback control augmentation system. 
6.2 Simulation Scenarios 
 In order to validate the proposed algorithm for solving the AIS-based failure 
accommodation problem one has to design specific flight scenarios. Since this research effort is a 
preliminary step to a more comprehensive problem and being held within certain restraints, the 
flight scenarios should not be extremely complicated. However, the flight envelope should be 
covered over a wide area to capture the dynamic fingerprint of the particular scenario (nominal 
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or failure conditions). The flight scenarios, lasting between 2 and 4 minutes, were designed to 
include steady state flight conditions and moderate maneuvers. These flight scenarios were first 
simulated under nominal flight conditions. They were repeated under various failure conditions 
for both design/development and validation purposes. Only one failure at a time is injected.  
 
 Two simplified maneuvers were considered, one in the vertical plane of symmetry and 
one on the lateral-directional channel with longitudinal coupling. The sampling rate of the 
simulation is 50Hz. 
 
6.2.1 Symmetric Climb/Descent 
The following are detailed steps of the symmetric climb/descent maneuver (Fig. 6.7): 
 steady state symmetric flight at 6050 m and Mach 0.75 for 30 seconds/1 minute 
 uniform climb to 6900 m (or descent to 5400 m) at Mach 0.75 
 steady state symmetric horizontal flight for 1 minute/30 seconds at the destination 
altitude (6900 m or 5400 m) and Mach 0.75 
 




6.2.2 Coordinated Half Turn 
 The following are detailed steps of the coordinated half turn maneuver (Fig. 6.8): 
 steady state symmetric flight at 6050 m and Mach 0.75 for 30 seconds 
 coordinated half turn at constant bank angle while maintaining altitude and velocity 
 




Chapter 7 Implementation of Failure Accommodation 
System 
 
7.1 Data Acquisition for AIS Development 
 The pilot performs the flight tests according to the simulation scenarios that are 
described in Chapter 6. The tests are performed under nominal and failure conditions. After all 
the data from sensors, stick displacements, and throttle are collected, one can proceed to the 
design and implementation of the accommodation algorithm. 
7.1.1 Symmetric Climb/Descent 
 For the climbing flight scenario the following set of flight features FF was selected: 
aircraft velocity V, roll rate p, pitch rate q, yaw rate r, altitude H, and pitch angle θ. 
 The total number of selected features is Nf = 6.Therefore the selected set of flight 
features FF is: 
 
𝐹𝐹 = {𝑉, 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝐻, 𝜃}   (7.1) 
 
 The pilot generated commands are the following: longitudinal channel stick 
displacement de, lateral channel stick displacement da, directional channel pedals displacement 
dr, and throttle displacement dt. 
 The total number of pilot control commands is Ncc=4. The set of pilot control 
commands PC can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝐶 = {𝑑𝑒, 𝑑𝑎, 𝑑𝑟, 𝑑𝑡}   (7.2) 
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 The antigen vector AGv will consist of elements that represent the differences between 
the desired and actual values of corresponding feature. However, antigen vector has to be 
extended by including additional elements that represent the actual values of certain features.  
The additional features for the extension of antigen vector are: bank angle φ, pitch angle θ, yaw 
angle ψ, pitch rate q, altitude H. 
 
 Finally, the antigen vector AGv can be represented as follows: 
𝐴𝐺𝑣 = {𝛥𝑉, 𝛥𝑝, 𝛥𝑞, 𝛥𝑟, 𝛥𝐻, 𝛥𝜃, 𝜑, 𝜃, 𝜓, 𝑞, 𝐻}  (7.3) 
  
 The flight duration time is T=130s, consequently the overall number of time samples is 
ts=6500. The number of time samples used prior to the current moment in the matching 
algorithm is selected to be Nt=4. After analyzing the data from pilot performance, the minimum 
and maximum values of corresponding elements of the AG matrix have been identified. These 
values are used for the normalization process and are presented in Table 7.1: 
Table 7.1: Symmetric Climb - Maximum and Minimum Values for Normalization 
 
7.1.2 Coordinated Half Turn 
 For the coordinated half turn maneuver the following set of flight features FF was 




 The total number of selected features is Nf = 6. The selected set of flight features FF 
can be expressed as: 
𝐹𝐹 = {𝑉, 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝐻, 𝜑}  (7.4) 
 The pilot generated commands are the same as in the climb maneuver. The total 
number of pilot control commands is Ncc = 4.Therefore, the set of pilot control commands PC 
can be presented as follows: 
𝑃𝐶 = {𝑑𝑒, 𝑑𝑎, 𝑑𝑟, 𝑑𝑡}   (7.5) 
 The additional features for the extension of antigen vector are: bank angle φ, pitch 
angle θ, yaw angle ψ, roll rate p. 
 
 Finally, the antigen vector AGv can be represented as: 
𝐴𝐺𝑣 = {𝛥𝑉, 𝛥𝑝, 𝛥𝑞, 𝛥𝑟, 𝛥𝐻, 𝛥𝜑, 𝜃, 𝜓, 𝑝}  (7.6) 
 The flight duration time is T=215s, consequently the overall number of time samples is 
ts=10750. The number of time samples used prior to the current moment in the matching 
algorithm is selected to be Nt=4. After analyzing the data from pilot performance, the minimum 
and maximum values of corresponding elements of the AG matrix have been identified. These 
values are used for the normalization process and presented in Table 7.2: 
 





7.2 Accommodation Simulink Model 
 
 The purpose of this section is to briefly describe the implementation of the developed 
system using Matlab/Simulink environment.  
 
 A special Simulink block was built for implementing the failure accommodation 
system (Fig.7.1) and integrated within the WVU simulation environment. This block consists of 
two main components: the commands generating block and the algorithm outcomes. The inputs 
to the generating block are the signals from aircraft sensors. The outcomes of the algorithm block 
are the control commands on longitudinal, lateral and directional channels, and a thrust 




Figure 7.1: Accommodation System Components 
 
 Figure 7.2 presents the aircraft control system block of the model described in previous 





Figure 7.2: Aircraft Control System Block 
 The detailed structure of the commands generating block is illustrated in Fig. 7.3. It 
consists of four main components: reference input block, antigens, AIS memory block, and 
control laws generation block. The algorithm functions as follows: 
1) The signals coming from the aircraft sensors are compared to the ones in the reference 
input block. The outcome signals form the Antigens block. The process illustrates a 
healthy organism being attacked by invaders. 
2) T-cells and B-cells block and Antibodies block altogether constitute the AIS memory. 
3) All the information from AIS memory block proceeds to control laws generation block, 
where the matching algorithm is performed (a MATLAB code which executes the 
matching algorithm is presented in thesis Appendix). 
4) Outcome of the matching algorithm is a set of generated control commands that are sent 





Figure 7.3: Detailed Structure of the Control Commands Generating Block 
 
 The delay chain blocks allow accumulating values of in-coming feature over several 
time samples. This would represent the matching algorithm with floating window described in 
Chapter 5. 
 Note, that AIS memory block, which consists of T-cells, B-cells, and antibodies, is 
formed after all the data from the pilot performance were acquired. The artificial memory cells 
are built based on data from the flight under nominal conditions, aileron, stabilator, and rudder 
failures flight, and roll rate sensor failure flight. 
 
 The minimum total sum ERR together with its index in AIS memory are saved at each 




Chapter 8 Results and Performance Assessment 
 
 
 After all the necessary data were acquired, the AIS-based failure accommodation 
algorithm was designed, developed, and implemented within the WVU simulation environment. 
This chapter will illustrate the results of implementation of the proposed methodology to extract 
the control commands from the pilot performance under different flight conditions. All the 
figures that will be presented in this chapter will illustrate the time histories of the aircraft 
features and the commands. Every "feature" figure will contain three curves: 
 reference - the desirable value of the feature over the entire flight time that was 
prescribed during the experimental design stage 
 pilot - the value of the feature that was obtained during flight simulation when the aircraft 
was controlled by a pilot 
 generated - the value of the feature that was obtained during the flight simulation when 
the aircraft was controlled by the commands generated from the implemented failure 
accommodation system 
Every "command" figure will contain two curves: 
 pilot - value of stick displacement (which defines the control command) that was 
produced by the pilot during the flight simulation 
 generated - value of stick displacement that was obtained as an outcome of the failure 
accommodation system 
 
 For each type of maneuver and each type of failure, a certain set of results (figures) will 
be illustrated. Not all of the features involved into the entire accommodation mechanism will be 
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presented, because they do not affect the behavior of the aircraft or do not contribute 
significantly to the dynamic fingerprint of a particular flight condition.  
8.1 Symmetric Climb 
 The features that have the most significant dynamic impact during the symmetric climb 
maneuver are: pitch rate q, pitch angle θ, altitude H, and velocity V. 
8.1.1 Nominal Conditions 
 Figure 8.1 presents the variation of aircraft altitude during the symmetric flight under 
nominal conditions: 
 
Figure 8.1: Aircraft Altitude - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Climb 
 
 The generated altitude was very accurately reproduced and is very close to the altitude 
of pilot performance. There is a little deviation at the end of the flight; however, the trend - 
drifting down - is preserved. 
 Figure 8.2 presents the velocity of the aircraft. A noticeable drop of velocity value can 
be observed from seconds 70 to 90. This happens due to the fact that the aircraft climbs during 
this period of time. The increased drop in velocity during automatic flight is due to the 
inaccuracy of throttle command extraction during the final interval of the maneuver. Also, the 
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discontinuity of the extracted throttle command curve might have affected such a difference in 
velocity. However, it should be noticed that the maximum velocity tracking error is 
approximately 7% of commanded velocity. 
 
Figure 8.2: Aircraft Velocity - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figure 8.3 presents the longitudinal channel control commands. The outcomes of the 
failure accommodation system almost coincide with the pilot performance. Small insignificant 
inaccuracies might be noticed, but they can appear due to randomness of sensor noise and 
turbulence.  
 
Figure 8.3: Longitudinal Channel Commands - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Climb 























































 Figure 8.4 presents the throttle displacement. For most of the time, the extraction of the 
thrust command from the AIS is adequate. However, there are some inaccuracies at the 
beginning and at the end of the flight. Due to these inaccuracies the deviation of the generated 
aircraft velocity from the desired value is slightly more significant that the one obtained under 
pilot's control. 
 
Figure 8.4: Throttle Displacement - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figure 8.5 presents the pitch rate of the aircraft. Pitch rate variation is mostly dictated 
by the longitudinal command. Therefore, since the generated longitudinal commands almost 
coincide with the pilot outcome, the pitch rate behaves similarly. 
 
Figure 8.5: Aircraft Pitch Rate - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Climb 


















































 Figure 8.6 presents the pitch angle of the aircraft. Notice that the trim pitch angle is a 
slightly above zero. The pilot executed the climb with a constant θ value, and the same trend can 
be observed for the generated flight simulation. 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Aircraft Pitch Angle - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Climb 
  
 Based on these results, it can be concluded that the command extraction under nominal 
conditions for the symmetric climb maneuver was successful. 
8.1.2 Actuator Failure 
 Three types of the actuators were subjected to a failure (blockage at the deflection of 
+4 degrees): left aileron, left stabilator, and left rudder. Failure injection time in all of the tests is 
Tf=15s 
 


























8.1.2.1 Aileron Failure 
 Figure 8.7 presents the variation of the flight altitude. Similarly to the nominal 
conditions flight, the generated altitude slightly deviates from pilot performance at the end of the 
flight by approximately 1.5%. 
 
Figure 8.7: Aircraft Altitude - Aileron Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
Figure 8.8 presents the aircraft velocity. The velocity drops down during the climbing 
phase of the flight. The increased drop in velocity during automatic flight is due to the 
inaccuracy of throttle command extraction during the final interval of the maneuver. However, 
notice that the similarity is higher as compared to the flight under nominal conditions. 
 
Figure 8.8: Aircraft Velocity - Aileron Failure Symmetric Climb 





















































 Figure8.9 presents the longitudinal channel commands. Although the failure mostly 
affects the roll channel, it had some influence on the pitch channel as well. The pilot had to 
provide some compensation after the failure to maintain the steady state flight. The generated 
commands duplicate pilot input extremely well. 
 
Figure 8.9: Longitudinal Channel Commands - Aileron Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figure 8.10 illustrates aircraft pitch angle. A little bump can be noticed right after the 
failure injection. The pilot executed the climb maneuver at a constant θ value.  
 
Figure 8.10: Aircraft Pitch Angle - Aileron Failure Symmetric Climb 

























































Figure 8.11 presents the bank angle φ. A significant change of bank angle after the 
aileron failure can be observed. However, the value was brought back due to pilot's input on the 
lateral channel. 
 
Figure 8.11: Aircraft Bank Angle - Aileron Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figure 8.12 presents the lateral commands. Pilot provided significant input on the 
lateral channel after the failure was injected to maintain prescribed steady state flight. The 
generated commands repeated this action accurately.   
 
Figure 8.12: Lateral Channel Commands - Aileron Failure Symmetric Climb 






















































 Figures 8.13 and 8.14 present aircraft pitch and roll rates, respectively. Behavior of 
these features is mostly governed by longitudinal and lateral commands; therefore, the results are 
quite precise too. A significant peak of the roll rate can be noticed right after the failure 
occurrence.  
 
Figure 8.13: Aircraft Pitch Rate - Aileron Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
Figure 8.14: Aircraft Roll Rate - Aileron Failure Symmetric Climb 



















































 Figure 8.15 illustrates the variation of the Y coordinate. After the failure occurrence, 
the aircraft intends to deviate from the straight flight to the right. At the time, pilot intends to 
maintain a straight forward trajectory. As a result, we can observe that the aircraft returned back 
to the initial Y coordinate position (close to zero). 
 
Figure 8.15: Y Coordinate - Aileron Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
8.1.2.2 Stabilator Failure 
 Figure 8.16 and 8.17 present the aircraft altitude and velocity, respectively. A small 
decrease of altitude can be noticed at around T=20s due to the stabilator failure. Aircraft velocity 
variation during automatic flight is very similar to the one during piloted flight and does not 
deviate significantly as in previous tests. 
 
 



























Figure 8.16: Aircraft Altitude - Stabilator 
Failure Symmetric Climb 
Figure 8.17: Aircraft Velocity - Stabilator 
Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figure 8.18 illustrates variation of the aircraft pitch angle θ. A significant change of 
pitch angle is observed due to stabilator failure.  
 
Figure 8.18: Aircraft Pitch Angle - Stabilator Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figure 8.19 illustrates the longitudinal channel commands. Notice that the pilot 
workload on the longitudinal channel has significantly increased, in comparison with previously 
illustrated results. Small insignificant inaccuracies can be observed. 












































































Figure 8.19: Longitudinal Channel Commands - Stabilator Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figure 8.20 illustrates the lateral channel commands. Although the failure was mostly 
on the longitudinal channel, pilot workload on the lateral channel is larger. The generated 
commands almost coincide with the pilot input. 
 
Figure 8.20: Lateral Channel Commands - Stabilator Failure Symmetric Climb 
 































































Figure 8.21 illustrates Y coordinate variation. Although the stabilator failure mostly 
affects the longitudinal channel, a coupling with lateral channel takes place. Therefore, because 
of the bank angle φ alteration, the aircraft intends to deviate from the straight forwards trajectory 
(see Fig. 8.22). 
 
Figure 8.21: Y Coordinate - Stabilator Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 
Figure 8.22: Aircraft Bank Angle - Stabilator Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
















































8.1.2.3 Rudder Failure 
 Figures 8.23 and 8.24 illustrate the aircraft altitude and velocity respectively. The 
altitude of the generated flight almost coincides with the pilot performance outcome. Velocity 
has been reproduced quite accurately as well. 
Figure 8.23: Aircraft Altitude - Rudder 
Failure Symmetric Climb
Figure 8.24: Aircraft Velocity - Rudder 
Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figure 8.25 illustrates the variation of the yaw angle ψ. Yaw angle was directly affected 
by the rudder failure. However, one can notice that the change of the feature value after the 
failure is not so significant (as compared to pitch angle change after stabilator failure or bank 
angle change after aileron failure). 
 
Figure 8.25: Aircraft Yaw Angle - Rudder Failure Symmetric Climb 









































































 Figure 8.26 illustrates directional channel commands. Directional channel commands 
were extracted successfully. However at the end of the simulation, some of the commands were 
not accurately extracted. This happened because of the following: small inaccuracies in 
generated directional commands at t=40-50s have led to deviations of the yaw angle. This 
deviation, afterwards, has influenced the matching algorithm in the ultimate interval of the flight. 
 
Figure 8.26: Directional Channel Commands - Rudder Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figure 8.27 illustrates variation of the pitch angle θ and shows that the climbing 
maneuver was performed at a constant θ value. 


































Figure 8.27: Aircraft Pitch Angle - Rudder Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Longitudinal channel commands have been extracted from the AIS memory 
successfully, which is proven by almost coinciding curves in Fig. 8.28 
 
Figure 8.28: Longitudinal Channel Commands - Rudder Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figure 8.29 presents the variation of the bank angle φ. A significant change of the value 
can be noticed after the failure injection. Only one lateral channel impulse input was needed to 
fix the consequences of the failure (see Fig. 8.30). 

























































Figure 8.29: Aircraft Bank Angle - Rudder 
Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
Figure 8.30: Lateral Channel Commands - 
Rudder Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
Figure 8.31 illustrates the variation of the Y coordinate. Because of some inaccuracies of 
the generated commands on directional channel, the Y coordinates depart after T=50s. However, 
is should be noted that given the forward velocity of the aircraft and the 2 minute duration of the 
test, the approximately 200m final offset in lateral position is small. 
 
Figure 8.31: Y Coordinate - Rudder Failure Symmetric Climb 
 















































































8.1.3 Sensor Failure 
 Roll rate sensor failure was investigated within this research effort. A sensors bias 
failure was considered, which implies shifting the value of the measured roll rate by +3 deg/s 
from the true value. Failure injection time is Tf=15s. 
 
 Figure 8.32 illustrates the trajectory of symmetric climb. Trajectory has been accurately 
simulated and followed the pilot's outcome. A small delay in climbing process can be noticed. 
Also, the altitude deviates from the desired value in the final stage of the flight.  
 
Figure 8.32: Aircraft Altitude - Sensor Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Figures 8.33 and 8.34 present the variation of aircraft velocity and throttle commands, 
respectively. Throttle command has been accurately generated until the moment of 
approximately T=90s, where it dropped down, while pilot was still intending to accelerate for 
about 25-30 seconds. This error in throttle command resulted in a minor velocity difference at 





Figure 8.33: Aircraft Velocity - Sensor 
Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
Figure 8.34: Throttle Command - Sensor 
Failure Symmetric Climb 
 
 Longitudinal channel commands have been generated accurately enough during the 
sensor failure flight and are presented in Fig. 8.35. The generated commands followed the pilot 
trend, including the beginning of the flight when the failure was injected. Several inaccuracies 
can be observed during the climb maneuver; however, they did not have an essential effect on 
the aircraft pitch angle (see Fig.8.36). Looking at the variation of pitch angle and aircraft altitude 
it can be concluded that longitudinal commands have been extracted successfully. 
 
Figure 8.35: Longitudinal Channel 
Commands - Sensor Failure Symmetric 
Climb 
 
Figure 8.36: Aircraft Pitch Angle - Sensor 
Failure Symmetric Climb 































 Lateral channel commands extraction was not as successful as the one for the 
longitudinal channel – Fig. 8.37. Generally, the plot does not look very neat with significant 
inaccuracies in the extraction. However, it can be noted that at the initial stage of the flight, the 
commands that were dedicated to overcome the injected failure have been generated very 
accurately. The outcome of these inaccuracies can be observed in Fig. 8.38. The aircraft deviates 
from the straight flight due to incorrect lateral channel commands. The deviation of the aircraft 
from the straight flight can also be explained by Fig. 8.39, which illustrates the variation of the 
bank angle during the flight. It can be seen that the bank angle was accurately generated at the 
beginning (failure injection time) and in the middle of the flight time. However, in between and 
after these periods, we can observe that the impulse commands generated on the lateral channel 
were not large enough to bring the bank angle back to zero. The aircraft experienced a slight 
turn, which resulted in diverging from the desired direction  
 
 
Figure 8.37: Lateral Channel Commands - 
Sensor Failure Symmetric Climb 
 






Figure 8.39: Aircraft Bank Angle - Sensor Failure Symmetric Climb 
With these results, it can be concluded that the flight mission under sensor failure has 
been partially accomplished. The roll rate bias has been overcome on the longitudinal channel - 
the aircraft did not lose the altitude and performed the desired maneuver. However, the 
compensation on the lateral channel was insufficient, which resulted in a deviation from the 
straight forward flight. More investigation should be performed in this direction in future 
research. 
8.1.4Analysis and Evaluation 
 In addition to graphical results of extracting pilot control commands, some numerical 
computations have been executed to confirm and validate the outcomes. Since the flight 
maneuvers have been mostly defined by altitude and velocity, analysis with regard to these flight 
features has been performed. Three metrics have been used for the evaluation: Pilot Flight Error 
shows how accurately pilot performed the prescribed mission. Generated Flight Error shows 
how accurately the generated simulation performed the prescribed mission. Relative Error is an 
error of the generated simulation with respect to pilot performance. 

































| ∗ 100%  (8.3) 
 
where DesV is desired value of the feature at each moment of the flight, PilotV is a value of the 
feature obtained from pilot performance, GenV is a value of the feature obtained from the 
generated simulation.  
 
Table 8.1: Flight Simulation Performance Assessment - Symmetric Climb 
 
 As can be seen from Table 8.1, none of the altitude errors exceed mark of 1.5%, and 
none of the velocity errors exceed mark of 6%.Notice, that despite having significant errors for 
lateral channel commands under the sensor failure flight, the results for altitude and velocity are 




 Table 8.2 illustrates the amount of pilot workload on all four channels under different 
flight conditions. The first figure in the table relates to pilot workload, the second figure presents 
the integrated workload value of generated commands. The following metrics have been used: 
Wlong, Wlat, Wdir, and Wthr- representing the integral of the workload on longitudinal, lateral, 
directional, and throttle channels over the entire flight time, respectively. 






   (8.4) 
Where W is a workload on a corresponding channel, and stick is a corresponding stick 
displacement; entire time of flight is tf. 
 The workload generally increases with the presence of the failure. Interestingly, 
comprehensive input on lateral channel under stabilator failure flight is larger than under aileron 
failure flight. Notice that the workload on the lateral channel is excessive under the roll rate 
sensor failure. Injected failures did not affect throttle channel significantly (except for the throttle 
channel) 
 




8.2 Coordinated Half Turn 
 The symmetric climb maneuver was designed mostly to involve longitudinal channel 
commands, although coupling occurred due to the failures. Coordinated half turn is more focused 
on involving lateral channel commands. However, restriction about preserving the constant 
altitude makes pilot to work on the longitudinal channel as well. The flight features that should 
be highlighted during the analysis of this set of flight scenarios are: roll rate p, bank angle φ, 
altitude H, velocity V, and pitch angle θ. 
8.2.1 Nominal Conditions 
 Figure 8.40 presents the trajectory of the coordinated half turn in the XY horizontal 
plane. The entire maneuver was generated successfully without any significant differences from 
the pilot performance outcome.  
 
Figure 8.40: Flight Trajectory - Nominal Conditions Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Figure 8.41 presents the lateral channel commands. A short command at the beginning 
of the flight was produced to reach the desirable bank angle φ (see Fig. 8.42). Since it is a 
nominal conditions flight, the rest of the flight time no commands on this channel were needed.  






















a) Entire Flight Time     b) Failure Injection Time  
Figure 8.41: Lateral Channel Commands - Nominal Conditions Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 
Figure 8.42: Aircraft Bank Angle - Nominal Conditions Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Aircraft roll rate p follows the trend of the lateral stick input (see Fig. 8.43). Therefore, 
it has a short impulse at the beginning of the flight as well. 
























              a)Entire Flight Time                                b) Failure Injection Time 
Figure 8.43: Aircraft Roll Rate - Nominal Conditions Coordinated Half Turn 
 Figure 8.44 presents the longitudinal channel commands. When the aircraft is banked at 
a constant angle it tends to lose altitude; that is why the pilot must provide certain longitudinal 
commands to maintain the height. This task is not trivial because constant lateral input has to be 
preserved as well. Longitudinal command reproduction is not as neat and accurate; however it 
follows the pilot trend.  
 
Figure 8.44: Longitudinal Channel Commands - Nominal Conditions Coordinated Half Turn 
 






















































































 Figures 8.45 and 8.46 illustrate the aircraft altitude H and pitch rate q variation, 
respectively. These figures prove that, although the generated longitudinal commands were 
slightly inaccurate, they served the purpose and the aircraft altitude was well maintained and 
does not differ a lot from the pilot performance outcome. 
 
Figure 8.45: Aircraft Altitude - Nominal 
Conditions Coordinated Half Turn 
 
Figure 8.46: Aircraft Pitch Rate – Nominal 
Conditions Coordinated Half Turn 
 Figure 8.47 illustrates the aircraft velocity variation. Notice that the velocity did not 
change its value significantly during flight. This happened because pilot did not provide 
excessive throttle input (see Fig. 8.48). Velocity alteration was mainly dictated by the aircraft 
nose direction: up - decelerating, down - accelerating.  
 
Figure 8.47: Aircraft Velocity – Nominal 
Conditions Coordinated Half Turn 
 
Figure 8.48: Throttle Displacement - 
Nominal Conditions Coordinated Half Turn 












































































































8.2.2 Actuator Failure 
 The same types of actuator failures as for the climb maneuver have been implemented 
for coordinated half turn: left aileron, left stabilator, and left rudder locked at +4 degrees. Failure 
injection time for all the cases is at Tf=15s. 
 
8.2.2.1 Aileron Failure 
 Figure 8.49 presents the flight trajectory in XY plane. The generated trajectory almost 
coincides with the one from pilot performance.  
 
Figure 8.49: Flight Trajectory - Aileron Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Figure 8.50 illustrates the lateral channel commands. A short lateral input is noticed 
right after the failure occurrence. It was provided to mitigate the consequences of the failure. 
Over the entire period of time the lateral channel commands have been extracted successfully 
with some minor inaccuracies at the end.  






















Figure 8.50: Lateral Channel Commands - Aileron Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Bank angle φ experienced a significant change at the beginning due to the failure; 
however, it has been brought back to zero value by pilot efforts (see Fig. 8.51). 
 
Figure 8.51: Aircraft Bank Angle - Aileron Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 



























































Aircraft roll rate p variation is governed mostly by lateral channel input; therefore, it 
follows its trend. (see Fig.8.52): 
 
Figure 8.52: Aircraft Roll Rate - Aileron Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Figure 8.53 illustrates longitudinal channel commands. Note that pilot workload on this 
channel is very large. The pilot input has been very accurately extracted and reproduced. The 
lines almost coincide at the beginning, with some minor deviations at the end.  
 
Figure 8.53: Longitudinal Channel Commands - Aileron Failure Coordinated Half Turn 

























































 The result of generated longitudinal stick input can be seen in Fig.8.54 and Fig. 8.55, 
which represent aircraft altitude H and pitch angle θ, respectively. An overall decreasing 
tendency can be observed due to persistence of constant bank angle φ. 
 
Figure 8.54: Aircraft Altitude - Aileron 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
Figure 8.55: Aircraft Pitch Angle - Aileron 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn
 
 Figures 8.56 and 8.57 illustrate aircraft velocity and throttle displacement, respectively. 
Pilot workload on changing the thrust level is not very significant. The velocity variation was 
mainly affected by aircraft pitch (upwards or downwards). 
 
Figure 8.56: Aircraft Velocity - Aileron 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
Figure 8.57: Throttle Displacement - Aileron 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn








































































































8.2.2.2 Stabilator Failure 
 Figure 8.58 presents the flight trajectory in XY plane. An excellent duplication of pilot 
performance can be observed. The lines almost coincide. 
 
Figure 8.58: Flight Trajectory - Stabilator Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Longitudinal channel commands can be seen in Fig. 8.59 There is a considerable input 
signal at the beginning of the flight that has been provided to mitigate the failure. The generated 
simulation provided that signal as well. During the rest of the time, the commands are extracted 
very accurately, with several inaccuracies at the end.  
 
Figure 8.59: Longitudinal Channel Commands - Stabilator Failure Coordinated Half Turn 




















































 Longitudinal channel commands dictate the behavior of the pitch angle θ and pitch rate 
q during the flight. Similarity of the trends can be seen in Fig. 8.60 and Fig. 8.61. Due to the 
inaccuracies of the longitudinal stick displacement at the end, pitch angle θ slightly deviates 
from the feature obtained from pilot performance. 
 
Figure 8.60: Aircraft Pitch Angle - 
Stabilator Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
Figure 8.61: Aircraft Pitch Rate - Stabilator 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 Lateral channel control commands are presented in Fig. 8.62: 
 
Figure 8.62: Lateral Channel Commands - Stabilator Failure Coordinated Half Turn 




















































































Because of the coupling, the pilot had to provide some commands on the lateral channel as well 
right after the failure was injected. Over the entire flight, the commands have been extracted 
precisely: the lines almost coincide. 
 
 Generated bank angle φ dictated by the lateral commands also follows the pilot 
performance outcome accurately (Fig. 8.63). A little peak is observed at the beginning of the 
flight due to the failure; however, the value has been brought back close to zero by pilot 
compensation. Aircraft roll rate p is presented in Fig. 8.64. 
 
 
Figure 8.63: Aircraft Bank Angle - 
Stabilator Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
Figure 8.64: Aircraft Roll Rate - Stabilator 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Aircraft velocity and throttle displacement are illustrated in Fig. 8.65 and Fig. 8.66, 
respectively. No significant activity can be observed on throttle. Generated velocity follows the 
pilot trend very accurately, with some deviations close to the end of the flight.  



















































Figure 8.65: Aircraft Velocity - Stabilator 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
Figure 8.66: Throttle Displacement - 
Stabilator Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
8.2.2.3 Rudder Failure 
 Figure 8.67 presents the flight trajectory in the XY horizontal plane. The generated 
trajectory is not as accurate as under aileron or stabilator failure, however, still remains valid and 
follows the pilot's trend. 
 
Figure 8.67: Flight Trajectory - Rudder Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
















































































 Longitudinal channel commands are presented in Fig. 8.68. Generated controls follow 
the pilot' inputs quite accurately. However, the overall performance is not very accurate as 
compared to the previous tests: 
 
Figure 8.68: Longitudinal Channel Commands - Rudder Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Inaccuracies in generated longitudinal commands affected the behavior of pitch angle 
θ, which resulted in some deviations as well (see Fig.8.69). However, the generated altitude 
alteration was not significantly different from the one from pilot performance (Fig.8.70). 
 
Figure 8.69: Aircraft Altitude - Rudder 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
Figure 8.70: Aircraft Pitch Angle - Rudder 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 











































































 Figure 8.71 illustrates lateral channel commands. A substantial pilot input signal can be 
observed at the beginning of the flight. The generated signal was extracted adequately; however 
the magnitude of the signal was not as high. The effect of this inaccuracy can be seen in Fig. 8.72 




Figure 8.71: Lateral Channel Commands - 
Rudder Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
Figure 8.72: Aircraft Bank Angle - Rudder 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Pilot workload on directional channel appeared to be large (Fig. 8.73). Although 
generally the figure does not look neat, generated commands follow the pilot trend and result in 
quite accurate duplication of yaw angle ψ (Fig. 8.74). 





















































Figure 8.73: Directional Channel Commands- Rudder Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 
a) Entire Flight Time                                b) Failure Injection Time 
Figure 8.74: Aircraft Yaw Angle - Rudder Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Aircraft velocity and throttle commands are illustrated in Fig. 8.75 and Fig. 8.76, 
respectively: 














































































Figure 8.75: Aircraft Velocity – Rudder 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
Figure 8.76: Throttle Displacement – 
Rudder Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
8.2.3 Sensor Failure 
 The same sensor failure as for the symmetric climb has been investigated - roll rate 
sensor step bias. Failure injection time is Tf=15s. 
 Figure 8.77 illustrates the flight trajectory in the XY horizontal plane. Generated 
trajectory follows the pilot trend; however, the generated curve has a smaller radius of turn as 
compared to the one from the pilot performance outcome. This can be explained by several 
inaccuracies in reproducing lateral channel commands. 
 
Figure 8.77: Flight Trajectory - Sensor Failure Coordinated Half Turn 

















































































 Figure 8.78 presents the variation of the altitude during the flight simulation. The 
generated outcome follows the pilot trend during the entire flight time, except for the last 20 
seconds. In the end a drop in altitude (200m) can be observed. Note that the drop can be 
observed during the pilot performance as well; however, its magnitude is less significant.  
 
Figure 8.78: Aircraft Altitude - Sensor Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Figure 8.79 presents the lateral channel commands provided during the flight 
simulation. The commands have not been extracted as accurately as for actuator failures; 
however, they behave similarly to pilot generated commands with a small delay and several 
inaccuracies of small magnitude. The delay and these small inaccuracies did not have a 
significant effect on the behavior of bank angle (see Fig. 8.80). Note that there is no crucial need 
in extracting the pilot commands extremely accurately. The main idea is to extract the commands 
in such way, such that the corresponding maneuver key features behave similarly to the ones 
from pilot performance outcome (e.g. bank angle, altitude). It can be seen that the bank angle 
was reproduced accurately with several imperfections at the end of the flight simulation.  



























Figure 8.79: Lateral Channel Commands - 
Sensor Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
Figure 8.80: Aircraft Bank Angle - Sensor 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Figure 8.81 illustrates the commands on the longitudinal channel. Similarly to the 
lateral channel, the command extraction is not as accurate as for actuator failure; however, the 
similar trend can be observed in the behavior. These inaccuracies on longitudinal and lateral 
channels can be explained by excessive amount of the pilot workload and rapid change of stick 
displacement during the flight. For the flight with a large pilot workload and very intensive stick 
commands, a more advanced matching algorithm might be needed for obtaining higher 
performance results. Also, there is a delay between pilot input and aircraft response which 
becomes more critical when abrupt maneuvers are involved. Under such conditions, this delay 
should be better taken into account.  One possible solution could be to increase the time window. 
 
 Figure 8.82 presents the variation of pitch attitude angle θ and, as expected, it 
resembles the aircraft altitude variation. The feature has been generated accurately during the 
entire time of the flight with a small delay. However, a larger difference can be observed at 
during the final period of the flight (T=170-180 seconds). 
 


























































Figure 8.81: Longitudinal Channel 
Commands - Sensor Failure Coordinated 
Half Turn 
 
Figure 8.82: Aircraft Pitch Angle - Sensor 
Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 Aircraft roll rate has been generated precisely enough throughout the entire flight time, 
and was particularly accurate at the failure injection time (see Fig 8.83).Interestingly, at the 
moment of the turn (30sec), the generated signal reacts faster than pilot to the reference input 
signal. Overall performance is satisfactory, except for one peak approximately at 130 sec, when 
the generated signal did not follow the pilot command. 
 
a) Full Time     b) Failure Injection Period 
Figure 8.83: Aircraft Roll Rate - Sensor Failure Coordinated Half Turn 









































































































 Aircraft velocity during the generated simulation is very similar to the result of pilot 
performance with an insignificant difference of approximately 1-2 m/s during almost the entire 
flight (Fig. 8.84). A slightly more visible deviation can be observed during the last period of 
flight - generated velocity has higher magnitude here. This can be explained by the fact that the 
aircraft was diving during this period of time. 
 
Figure 8.84: Aircraft Velocity - Sensor Failure Coordinated Half Turn 
 
8.2.4 Analysis and Evaluation 
The same metrics, as for symmetric climb maneuver, have been used in this section. 
Table 8.3 presents the coordinated half turn simulation assessment. As the table 
illustrates, the results are very accurate: none of the errors exceed the mark of 2%. Table 8.4 
illustrates the amount of pilot workload on all four channels under different flight conditions. 
Pilot workload generally increases with the presence of the failure, as expected. Flights under 
aileron and sensor failures require the maximum overall pilot workload. Notice that in general, 
the figures for the coordinated half turn are much higher than for the symmetric climb. This 



























means that the coordinated half turn maneuver is more complicated, and requires more pilot 
activity. Only throttle activity is higher for the symmetric climb maneuver, as expected. In order 
to maintain constant velocity, pilot has to provide a lot of throttle input during the process of 
climbing. 
Table 8.3: Flight Simulation Performance Assessment - Coordinated Half Turn 
 
 





8.3 Symmetric Descent 
The features that have the most significant dynamic impact during the symmetric descent 
maneuver are the same as for the symmetric climb maneuver: pitch rate q, pitch angle θ, altitude 
H, and velocity V. Symmetric descent maneuver has not been investigated in such detail as 
symmetric climb. The results have been obtained for the nominal conditions flight. 
Figure 8.85 presents the aircraft altitude variation during the symmetric descent flight. 
Altitude response has been generated very accurately, although there is a small deviation from 
pilot performance outcome at the final stage of the flight. Approximate tracking error does not 
exceed 60 meters. This type of behavior of the aircraft altitude curve, namely very accurate result 
for the initial period of the flight, and less accurate result for the final period of the flight, can be 
explained by the longitudinal channel commands extraction.  
 
Figure 8.85: Aircraft Altitude - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Descent 
 



























Figure 8.86 illustrates the longitudinal channel commands. A perfect command extraction 
can be observed up until the time T=30 seconds. This explains the almost coinciding curves of 
the altitude plot during the initial period of the flight. Afterwards, several minor inaccuracies can 
be noticed in commands extraction. This time period of the maneuver corresponds to 
approaching the desired altitude and maintaining a steady state flight. During the final period of 
the flight, a constant generated input of a small magnitude on the longitudinal channel can be 
observed. This extraction imperfection can explain the deviation from the desired altitude at the 
end of the maneuver.  
 
Figure 8.86: Longitudinal Channel Commands - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Descent 
 
Aircraft pitch rate variation is mostly dictated by the longitudinal channel commands. 
Therefore, as expected, it behaves very similarly, and the same trend can be noticed in Fig. 8.87. 
Interestingly, the constant small inaccuracies on the longitudinal channel did not affect 
significantly the aircraft pitch rate – the generated signal is almost the same as pilot output.  
































Figure 8.87: Aircraft Pitch Rate - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Descent 
 
Figures 8.88 and 8.89 illustrate aircraft velocity and throttle commands, respectively. 
Significant amount of inaccurate command extraction can be observed during the first 15-20 
seconds of the flight; however, as we can see from Fig. 8.89, it did not affect substantially the 
behavior of aircraft velocity, and the feature has been generated quite accurately. Although 
during the rest of the flight time the throttle commands were extracted precisely, a significant 
tracking error of the aircraft velocity can be noticed (the error is approximately 10-11 m/s, which 
does not exceed 5% error margin). This can be explained by the nature of the maneuver – the 
aircraft was diving, and the provided throttle commands were not enough to maintain the 
constant velocity. 
Based on these results, we can conclude that the extraction of the control commands for 
the symmetric descent maneuver under nominal conditions has been performed successfully. 
Implementing the same algorithm for different types of maneuvers (climb, descent, and turn) and 
getting good results proves the robustness of the proposed methodology. However, another set of 




























tests with different subsystem failures should be investigated for symmetric descent maneuver in 
order to completely confirm the credibility of the designed failure accommodation model.  
 
Figure 8.88: Throttle Command - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Descent 
 
Figure 8.89: Aircraft Velocity - Nominal Conditions Symmetric Descent 
























































8.4 Comprehensive Analysis and Assessment 
 Based on the results presented, it can be concluded that the extraction of compensatory 
commands for all the maneuvers that were considered has been performed successfully. High 
performance has been achieved for both nominal and failure conditions. For all the maneuvers, 
aileron and stabilator failures have been adequately handled by the algorithm with very high 
accuracy of extraction. Rudder failure has not been handled as successfully as other failures; 
however, the results are still very good and illustrate the capability of the proposed methodology 
of extracting commands.  
 During the analysis of the flight performance under pilot control and under 
accommodation system control one might notice that for several flight conditions the designed 
system provides better and more accurate results than the pilot. The accommodation system 
proposed in this research effort accumulates all the data from all the flights and selects the set of 
control commands that corresponds to the set of features that best match the current measured 
state. This matching set of features may occur at different times or even in a different test than 
the one involved in the comparison. It should also be noticed that the extracted pilot commands 
are applied dynamically and may result in a different response compared to the pilot performance 
outcome. 
 Analysis has shown that generally, as expected, an injected failure significantly 
increases pilot workload. The failure that has the most significant impact on the dynamic of the 
flight is locked stabilator. This happened due to coupling of longitudinal and lateral channels 
combined with the desirable condition of maintaining the altitude.  
 A special attention has to be paid to the roll rate sensor failure. The results for this 
failure could be considered partially successful. Flight features that have a significant impact on 
the maneuver such as velocity and altitude have been generated very accurately. However, 
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significant errors on the lateral channel have resulted in the deviation of the aircraft from the 
straight line flight during the climb maneuver, and smaller radius of the trajectory during the 
coordinated turn maneuver. Nevertheless, these results remain very promising with regard to 
compensatory commands extraction within the AIS paradigm, and require more extensive in-
detailed investigation in future. 
 During the process of investigation, development and validation of the proposed 
methodology of the flight failure accommodation, an approximate total of 50 flight tests have 




Chapter 9 Conclusions and Future Work 
 
9.1 Research Summary 
 
 The purpose of this research was to introduce a novel methodology for aircraft failure 
accommodation as a part of a comprehensive and integrated FDIEA process within the AIS 
paradigm. To achieve the purpose, the following steps have been accomplished: 
 An overview of the comprehensive and integrated FDIEA problem has been provided. 
Different solutions and alternatives for solving the FDIEA problem have been 
investigated in order to find a methodology that would meet all the problem 
requirements. 
 AIS paradigm has been chosen as a ground for solving the FDIEA problem in general 
and the accommodation part in particular. To support the choice of the methodology AIS-
scheme main advantages have been identified: complexity, specificity, and robustness.  
 Specific algorithms for failure accommodation within the AIS paradigm were designed, 
developed, and implemented within the WVU simulation environment.  
 Simulation results have been presented and analyzed to demonstrate the validity and 
promising capabilities of the proposed methodology.  
 
 The major effort during this research was the accommodation algorithm design and 
development. The following are the steps that have been accomplished to achieve this: 
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 A new mathematical model has been proposed with elements representing the main 
components of the natural immune system. Behavior of each element has been 
assimilated to the corresponding element of aircraft control system. 
 A specific matching algorithm that imitates antigen recognition by the immune system 
has been introduced. Different ways of improving the performance of the algorithm have 
been described as well.  
 WVU simulation environment has been utilized for data acquisition and algorithm 
implementation purposes. For the accommodation problem, two different types of 
maneuvers have been designed: symmetric climb/descent and coordinated half turn. The 
maneuvers were designed such that the dynamic fingerprint of the aircraft behavior under 
certain conditions could be captured. 
 WVU simulation environment aircraft health management analysis based on 
Matlab/Simulink software has been utilized for the proposed algorithm implementation. 
A special additional Simulink model has been built for the implementation of the 
accommodation algorithm. This additional model that consists of 2 major blocks has been 
successfully integrated within the existing WVU simulation environment. 
 
 The main contributions of this research effort are: 
 Possibility of extracting compensatory commands from previous pilot experience for 
failure accommodation purposes within the AIS paradigm has been demonstrated.  
 Capability of the developed algorithm to operate as an automatic control system and to 
follow the mission maneuvers has been confirmed. 
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 Effectiveness of the proposed solution on the unmanned aircraft model using the motion-
based flight simulator for a variety of actuator failures (and one sensor failure) has been 
demonstrated. 
 High performance in extracting compensatory commands has been achieved. The 
percentage errors in the key flight features - velocity and altitude - do not exceed the 
mark of 6%and remain below 1.5% for the large majority of the tests.  
 
 Implementation of the proposed AIS-scheme for failure accommodation can potentially 
have a significant impact on the safety of aircraft safety operation. However, extracting 
compensatory commands for control purposes within the AIS paradigm was only a first step in 
solving the more complicated and comprehensive general accommodation problem. In real life 
situations, the most important feature of the adaptive control system is to be able to deal with 
new, previously un-encountered types of failures.  
 
9.2 Future Work 
 Considering future research studies to improve and extend the proposed AIS-based 
methodology for integrated FDIEA problem in general and accommodation problem in 
particular, several recommendations are proposed as following: 
 
 Extend the area of possible flight failures. Different levels and severities of actuator and 
sensors failures have to be investigated. Structural and engine failures have to be included 
in the list of interest. 
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 Investigate the possibilities of improving the matching algorithm. This is expected to 
achieve higher performance in command extraction. 
 Build the AIS using comprehensive flight data. This involves the design of a set of more 
complicated coupled maneuvers over extended areas of the flight envelope. That would 
close the gap to real-life situations and allow investigating the robustness of the 
developed accommodation algorithm. 
 Integrate the proposed algorithm for failure accommodation with existing scheme for 
flight failure detection, identification, and evaluation. That would allow combining all 
components of the comprehensive FDIEA problem, integrating them into one single 
mechanism and implementing to some aircraft model to validate its functionality. 
 Investigate additional processing of the AIS extracted commands such as scaling and 
filtering. 
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MATLAB code for Matching Algorithm 
 
function [y,y4,y5]=  
fcn(u1,u2,u3,u4,u5,u6,u7,u8,u9,u10,u11,pilot_err_norm,pilot_contr_up) 
 
err_min=200; index=1;  











difference between current errors and pilot errors 
err_diff=abs([(u1-pilot_err_norm(k-4:k,1)); ...  
10*(u2-pilot_err_norm(k-4:k,2)); ... 



















min_features(5));    
err_diff_theta(i)=(err_diff_theta(i)-min_features(6))/(max_features(6)-




sum of errors 
ERROR=sum(err_diff)+sum(err_diff_h)+sum(err_diff_q)+10*sum(err_diff_phi)+10*s
um(err_diff_psi)+15*sum(err_diff_theta); 








y=[pilot_contr_up(index,1) pilot_contr_up(index,2) pilot_contr_up(index,3) 
pilot_contr_up(index,4)]; 
y4=err_min; 
y5=index; 
 
